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Carnivore: Is the Regulation of Wireless Technology a 
Legally Viable Option to Curtail the Growth of 
Cybercrime?  
Stephen W. Tountas* 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 11, 2000, the Wall Street Journal1 lifted the two-year 
shroud of secrecy on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 
“Carnivore”2 program. The FBI designed Carnivore to sift through 
the contents of a suspect’s e-mail and, when appropriate, to record 
the suspect’s e-mail address for further review. In response to privacy 
concerns, the FBI pointed to the rise in cybercrime as a national 
security threat justifying the use of programs such as Carnivore.3 In 
July of 2001, despite much criticism,4 the FBI announced its goal to 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI’s System to Covertly Search E-Mail Raises Legal 
Issues, Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3 (revealing that an unidentified 
internet service provider refused to comply with the FBI’s order to install Carnivore on its 
system).   
 2. The program is currently known as DCS1000, but for the purposes of this Note, will 
be referred to as Carnivore. The FBI changed the program’s name to curtail future controversy, 
particularly over the running joke that its operation “eats away” at constitutional liberties. See 
Matt McLaughlin, FBI’s Upgrade of Carnivore Includes a New Name, GOV’T COMPUTER 
NEWS (Feb. 12, 2001), available at http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/3661-1.html.  
 3. See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised By The FBI’s “Carnivore” Program: Hearing 
Before the House Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Issues] (statement by Dr. Donald Kerr, 
Director of the FBI’s Lab Division, finding that a wide variety of cybercrime threatens the 
safety, security, and privacy of others). 
 4. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Urges Congress to Put a 
Leash on “Carnivore” and Other Government Snoopware Programs (July 12, 2000), at 
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/ n071200b.html; Electronic Privacy Information Center’s 
Carnivore FOIA Litigation, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore; Michael Kirkland, 
Analysis: Bringing the FBI to Heel, United Press Int’l (Aug. 22, 2001) (describing the 
legislative movement to remove Carnivore from the FBI’s control).  
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further curtail crime by expanding Carnivore’s capabilities5 to 
include the monitoring of both incoming and outgoing wireless 
messages.6  
Although the FBI initially faced significant opposition to the 
usage and expansion of Carnivore, opinions drastically changed7 after 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.8 Within months of the 
attacks, an increasing amount of evidence surfaced to support the 
FBI’s contention that Osama bin Laden coordinated the assault by 
using both the Internet and wireless technology.9 This evidence 
reawakened the public to the merits of federally regulating electronic 
communication10 and prompted Congress to implement new 
legislation to combat cybercrime.11  
Rather than ending the debate, the new legislation begs the 
question of whether Carnivore is a legally viable means to combat 
cybercrime. Moreover, regardless of Carnivore’s constitutionality, a 
policy question emerges as to whether national security requires 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow, Jr., FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ Might Target Wireless Text, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 24, 2001, at E1 (discussing the possibility of Carnivore’s expansion to wireless 
technology); Erich Luening & Ben Charny, Carnivore to Add Wireless to its Menu?, ZDNET 
NEWS (Aug. 24, 2001) (explaining how Carnivore could become the de facto means to monitor 
wireless communications), at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-272144.html. 
 6. Wireless messaging involves sending short phrases through the numbered keypad of a 
cellular phone, “blackberry,” or paging device. Approximately 20 billion text messages were 
sent during 2000, 750 million of which were sent in North America. See Simon Romero, A 
Nation Challenged: The Surveillance; Bigger Brother in the Wireless World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2001, at C10.  
 7. See, e.g., Caron Carlson & Dennis Callaghan, I Need to Read Your E-Mail, EWEEK, at 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,113740,00.asp (Sept. 24, 2001) (discussing how even 
the most principled civil liberty groups will concede the need for increased regulation, but only 
when it will lead to a drastic improvement in national security). 
 8. See, e.g., Tim Golden, A Day of Terror: The Operation; Terrorism Carefully 
Synchronized and Devastatingly Effective, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A13 (providing a 
detailed account of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks). 
 9. See infra notes 64-68, 103 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 6 (explaining that, because “terrorists may have used 
wireless technology to coordinate the attacks, [it] has breathed new life into efforts to monitor 
even the most arcane and complex features of wireless networks”); Judith Lockwood Purcell, 
Wiretaps: Not To Worry, Yet, WIRELESS WEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 4 (stating that “[i]n the two 
weeks since attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, wireless carriers have seen a 
significant upsurge in requests for cell phone records and wiretaps”). 
 11. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act]. 
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Congress to disregard the inherent drawbacks of electronic 
surveillance by law enforcement agencies. 
Part I of this Note focuses on the judicial and legislative histories 
of the federal wiretap provisions and establishes the legal foundation 
for surveillance tools such as Carnivore. Part II discusses the FBI’s 
development and expansion of Carnivore and introduces the various 
facets of cybercrime that the FBI aims to prevent. Part III applies the 
modern wiretap provisions to Carnivore’s current incarnation, 
assessing whether wireless regulation is a legal exercise of the FBI’s 
authority. Part IV posits whether any legally viable alternatives to 
Carnivore exist and, if not, whether Carnivore is a necessary evil for 
winning the war against cybercrime. Lastly, Part V summarizes the 
findings and concludes the Note.  
I. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO OVERSEE THE 
MONITORING OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States12 
formally creates and protects a right to privacy for all U.S. citizens.13 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id.  
 13. For a discussion on the origins of the Fourth Amendment, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999), explaining:  
To make sense of the [Fourth A]mendment, we must go back to its framing. At that 
time, the legal protection against the invasion of privacy was trespass law. If someone 
entered your property and rifled through your stuff, that person violated your common 
law rights against trespass . . . . The law gave an officer an incentive to obtain a 
warrant before he searched; if he was uncertain, or wanted to avoid all risk of liability, 
he could first check his judgment by asking a judge . . . . The weak link in this system 
was the judge. If judges were too lax, then warrants would be too easy to get . . . . 
Having seen much abuse of the power to issue warrants, the framers were not keen to 
give judges control in determining whether the government’s searches were 
reasonable . . . . [Thus, t]he framers required that judges, when issuing warrants, name 
particularly “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” so that 
judges would not be able to issue warrants of general power. The immunity of the 
warrant would be limited to particular people and places, and only when probable 
cause existed to issue the warrant.  
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In Olmstead v. United States,14 the U.S. Supreme Court first 
considered whether telephone conversations could receive Fourth 
Amendment protection and held that they could not.15 The Court 
explained that, despite its trend to liberally construe the Fourth 
Amendment,16 it could not equate an “interception” with a wiretap 
that did not physically intrude on Olmstead’s house, paper, or 
effects.17 Therefore, the Court’s approach under Olmstead established 
that, unless the FBI obtains its evidence from an area that could be 
physically trespassed upon, its collection would neither require a 
warrant nor infringe upon Fourth Amendment protections.  
Justice Brandeis dissented sharply, finding that the government’s 
collection of phone conversations clearly violated the Fourth 
Amendment.18 Brandeis reasoned that wiretapping allows the FBI to 
potentially overhear both confidential and intimate information.19 He 
further cautioned that the Constitution must be viewed in light of the 
changing conditions, such as technology,20 in modern society.21 
 
Id. at 112-13. 
 14. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the government placed a wiretap on the office 
telephone line of its suspect and collected a significant amount of incriminating evidence. Id. at 
456. The wiretap’s installation never constituted a trespass on Olmstead’s property, as the 
government inserted small wires into the telephone lines of other resident houses. Id. at 457. 
 15. Id. at 466. The government collected evidence over a series of months, indicating 
Olmstead’s involvement in a conspiracy to illegally import, possess, and sell liquor. Id. at 455-
57.  
 16. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (finding that “constitutional 
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and 
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right”); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (finding that the “[Fourth 
Amendment] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon 
or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or 
by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers”). 
 17. 277 U.S. at 465. The Court further reasoned that people who install a telephone must 
intend to project their voice outside of their house, which would inevitably run through an 
exterior phone line, and, thus, would not be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466. See 
also LESSIG, supra note 13, at 115 (explaining that “[t]his conclusion was received with some 
surprise, and also with shock. Already much of life had moved to the wires. People were 
beginning to understand what it meant to have intimate contact ‘online’; they counted on the 
telephone system to protect their intimate secrets.”). 
 18. 277 U.S. at 479.  
 19. Id. at 475-76. 
 20. Justice Brandeis’s views were well ahead of his time, particularly with respect to 
advanced surveillance technology. Brandeis cryptically predicted that:  
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Accordingly, Brandeis contended that the government commits 
espionage and violates the Fourth Amendment when it engages in 
warrantless wiretaps.  
Almost forty years later in Katz v. United States,22 the Court 
formally adopted the views expressed in Justice Brandeis’s dissent 
and overruled the traditional Olmstead approach.23 In Katz, the Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the FBI to obtain or 
introduce any phone conversation recorded without a warrant.24 The 
Court found that the Fourth Amendment extends to the recording of 
oral conversations that are overheard without committing trespass 
under local property law.25 Thus, a seizure of evidence need not 
 
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in 
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home.  
Id. at 474.  
 Professor Lawrence Lessig views Justice Brandeis’s dissent as a cornerstone for cyberlaw, 
proclaiming: 
If there is a justice who deserves c-world’s praise, if there is a Supreme Court opinion 
that should be the model for cyberactivists in the future . . . it is this Justice, this 
opinion, and this case. Brandeis gave us a model for reading the Constitution to 
preserve its meaning, and its values, across time and context. It is a method that 
recognizes what has changed and accommodates that change to preserve something of 
what the framers originally gave us.  
LESSIG, supra note 13, at 116. 
 21. 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This contention is based on Brandeis’s 
characterization of the Constitution as a living document whose interpretation is subject to 
change. He stresses that a vital principle “must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions . . . . They are . . . ‘designed 
to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.’” Id. at 473 (quoting 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821)). See also LESSIG, supra note 13, at 
115 (explaining that “Brandeis acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment, as originally written, 
applied only to trespass. But it did so . . . because when it was written trespass was the [only] 
technology for invading privacy.”). 
 22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 23. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 24. 389 U.S. at 348. Here, the FBI collected its evidence by attaching a recording device 
to a public pay-phone, from which the suspect frequently placed his calls. Id. 
 25. Id. at 353. The Court further extrapolated that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures, [thus,] it becomes 
clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure.” Id. Moreover, the Court stressed that these concerns do not 
vanish based on the location of the FBI’s search and will protect an individual against an 
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physically intrude on the suspect’s property to receive Fourth 
Amendment protection and, therefore, must be accompanied by a 
warrant when obtained via wiretap.26 
In the wake of Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).27 This statute 
established a strict set of procedural guidelines with which the FBI 
must comply to intercept28 electronic information.29 First, Title III 
altered the procedure for enforcement agencies seeking a wiretap, 
requiring a written application30 to a judge of proper jurisdiction 
along with a showing of probable cause.31 Second, the judge who 
receives the application must affirm that probable cause actually 
exists before approving the issuance of a wiretap.32 Congress justified 
this radical departure based on two key concerns: first, to prevent 
arbitrary violations of personal privacy and, second, to protect 
 
unreasonable seizure, wherever he or she may be. Id. at 359. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 
(1994)).  
 28. Title III defines ‘intercept’ as the “acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, 
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).  
 29. Title III defines ‘electronic communication’ as: 
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, [or] electromagnetic . . . system 
that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include—  
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; 
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this 
title); or 
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a 
communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 30. The application must include: the identity of the officer seeking the wiretap; a full and 
complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by that officer; a statement whether 
other investigative procedures have been tried, or why they would fail; a statement of the 
anticipated time frame to intercept communications; and a statement whether previous 
applications were made to intercept the communications of the same person. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 
(1)(a)-(f) (1994).  
 31. Id. § 2518(3). 
 32. Id. 
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communication itself.33 As a result, Title III eliminated any ambiguity 
remaining after Katz34 and heightened the procedural requirements 
that all enforcement agencies must follow when applying for a 
wiretap. 
The Court first addressed Title III’s strict guidelines in Smith v. 
Maryland,35 holding that a legal distinction exists between evidence 
recorded by a pen register36 and evidence collected by wiretap.37 In 
Smith, the Court refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to 
information collected by a pen register, finding that such collection 
neither searches nor seizes evidence.38 Furthermore, the Court 
explained that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for a phone number, which phone companies routinely record 
for billing purposes.39 Thus, unlike a wiretap, the collection of readily 
accessible information, such as a phone number, will not receive 
Fourth Amendment protection and can be freely collected without a 
warrant.  
 
 33. See S. REP. NO. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2153; see also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1972) (stating that Title III was 
enacted as a “protection for ‘the victim of an unlawful invasion of privacy’ . . . . [,] to protect 
the privacy of communications, [and] . . . the integrity of court and administrative 
proceedings.”). Several years later, Congress furthered Title III’s progress by enacting the 
Privacy Act of 1974, which minimized the types of information that could be collected. See 
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988)). 
 34. Although Katz universally protected against unreasonable seizures of evidence, it 
failed to establish the procedural guidelines for an enforcement agency to follow when seeking 
a wiretap. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In effect, Title III’s changes instilled a strict set of guidelines to 
theoretically protect against any potential for governmental abuse.  
 35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 36. See generally New York Tel. Co. v. U.S., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (defining a 
pen register as “a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by 
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not 
overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.”). 
 37. 442 U.S. at 744-45.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 741-42. Unlike oral communication, the collection of phone numbers is distinct 
in that a person generally knows that the numbers dialed from a phone can potentially be 
accessed by a phone company for billing purposes and fraud. See generally New York Tel. Co., 
434 U.S. at 174-75 (finding that pen registers are often used by phone companies “for the 
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of the law”).  
 The Smith Court further explained that the suspect assumed the risk of divulging this 
evidence, as he voluntarily conveyed information that the phone company was capable of 
recording. 442 U.S. at 745. It is important to note, however, that these findings have no bearing 
on the privacy of actual phone conversations and is limited in scope to the privacy of outgoing 
phone numbers. Id. at 744-45.  
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In 1986, Congress amended Title III with the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)40 to institute a set of 
procedural guidelines for obtaining a pen register.41 In effect, the 
ECPA creates a hierarchy of governmental standards, most notably a 
strict standard for wiretapping and a more flexible standard for 
obtaining pen registers.42 Moreover, under the ECPA’s hierarchy, a 
pen register that is installed without judicial authority yields less 
restitution than an unauthorized wiretap.43 Thus, even though the 
ECPA functions to establish procedural guidelines for pen registers, it 
still reinforces Smith’s notion that a pen register should receive less 
protection than a wiretap.44  
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)45 to further advance the 
 
 40. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-09, 3121-27 (1994)). For a detailed discussion 
of the statutory changes enacted by the ECPA, see S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), available at WL 
S. Rep. 99-541. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994). An officer applying for a pen register need only show 
“the identity of . . . the State law enforcement or investigative officer making the application 
and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation[, along with] a 
certification . . . that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation being conducted by that agency.” Id. § 3122(b)(1)-(2). 
 42. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994) (establishing the standard for obtaining a 
wiretap) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (establishing the standard for obtaining a pen register). In 
particular, whereas a wiretap must be accompanied by a showing of “probable cause,” a pen 
register need only be “relevant” to an ongoing criminal investigation. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(3)(a) (requiring a showing of probable cause to receive a wiretap); § 3122(b)(2) 
(requiring that the information be “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation” to receive a 
pen register). 
 Additionally, a wiretap is limited to the investigation of specific felonies, such as 
counterfeiting, aircraft piracy, or the sale or distribution of narcotics. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516(1)(a)-(o). In contrast, pen registers are subject to no such limitation, as the guidelines for 
specific crimes are left entirely open-ended. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-3127 (failing to 
limit a pen register’s scope to an enumerated set of felonies). 
 Finally, whereas the FBI may operate a pen register for sixty days, the duration for 
operating a wiretap is only thirty days. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (stating that a wiretap may be 
in effect no longer than thirty days); 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (c)(1) (stating that a pen register may not 
be used for a period longer than sixty days).  
 43. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a), 2520 (allowing a person whose rights are violated 
by an illegal wiretap to move for a suppression of evidence and to receive civil damages) with 
§ 3121(d) (stating that “[w]hoever knowingly violates [the pen register requirements] shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both”).  
 44. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 
(1994)). 
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government’s role in modern surveillance.46 Generally, CALEA 
mandates that a provider of electronic service47 must assist in the 
installation of pen registers and wiretaps on its system when law 
enforcement requests as such.48 Further, the Act requires the internet 
service provider (ISP) to limit the device’s access to the specific 
information that the government is cleared to monitor.49 Lastly, 
CALEA mandated that all networks have the ability to accommodate 
authorized electronic surveillance by October 25, 1998.50 These 
changes permit the monitoring of a wireless packet-switched network 
that remains connected at all times,51 thus, bridging the gap between 
the ECPA and modern law to facilitate the implementation of 
 
 46. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1 (1994) (discussing the need to implement advanced 
forms of technology to maintain the government’s role in electronic surveillance).  
 47. The United States Code defines an “electronic communication service” as “any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1994) (stating that “[a]n order authorizing the interception of 
a wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . shall, upon request of the applicant . . . furnish the 
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
the interception unobtrusively”). 
 49. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (1994) (requiring a carrier to “expeditiously isolat[e] and 
enabl[e] the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-
identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier”). 
 50. See generally Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of: 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CC Docket No. 97-213 (Apr. 20, 1998) 
(soliciting public suggestions on the appropriate standard for the wireless industry) (on file with 
author); Heather Forsgren Weaver, Anti-Terrorism Legislation Hits Civil Liberties Wall, RCR 
WIRELESS NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, at 3 (explaining how CALEA gives the authority to allow 
wiretaps on packet-mode data).  
 Due to the objections of several wireless providers, such as AT&T and Lucent, the FCC 
extended its deadline until June 30, 2000, to allow the industry to develop the appropriate 
technology. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts Extension 
of CALEA Compliance Date (Sept. 11, 2000) (providing an extension of two years to develop 
the technology required by CALEA standards), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
Wireless/News_Releases/1998/nrwl8039.html. 
 In 2001, the FCC denied the wireless industry’s appeal for a blanket extension, but gave 
providers until November 19, 2001, to either bring themselves within compliance with packet-
mode communications or seek individual relief. See Press Release, Federal Communications 
Commission, FCC Denies Blanket Extension For Packet-Mode Communications, Temporarily 
Suspends CALEA “Punch List” Deadline (Sept. 19, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Common_Carrier/News_Releases/2001/nrcc0137.html. 
 
 51. See, e.g., J. William Gurley, Making Sense of the Wireless Internet, CNET NEWS, Aug. 
14, 2000 (explaining how a packet-switched network differs from a circuit-switched network), 
at http://news.com.com/2010-1072-281347.html?legacy=cnet. In general, a packet-switched 
network remains online at all times, whereas a circuit-switched network is only accessed at 
limited times through the use of a modem over an ordinary phone line. Id.  
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governmental surveillance. 
On September 11, 2001, seventeen terrorists collectively hijacked 
four airplanes flying within the United States and crashed them into 
both the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C.52 In response to this catastrophe, Congress enacted 
the USA Patriot Act (Patriot Act),53 radically altering federal wiretap 
and pen register provisions.54 First, the Act specifically states that pen 
registers may be used to collect information transmitted both over the 
Internet and among computer networks.55 Second, the Act extends the 
jurisdiction of all pen registers across the United States, abandoning 
the traditional limitations placed upon the issuing court.56 Third, the 
Act requires an enforcement official to file for a special court order to 
attain the pen register.57 Lastly, the Act requires an ISP that is hosting 
a surveillance device to supply the court with the name of the officer 
who installed the program, the date of installation, and the 
configuration under which it is programmed to search.58 By making 
judicial approval more easily obtainable for electronic 
communications monitoring, these changes are evidence of 
congressional endorsement of the Carnivore technology.  
In sum, while the law still preserves a hierarchy for obtaining 
wiretaps and pen registers,59 it has come a long way since the original 
 
 52. See, e.g., Tim Golden, A Day of Terror: The Operation; Terrorism Carefully 
Synchronized and Devastatingly Effective, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A13 (providing a 
detailed account of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States).  
 53. See Patriot Act, supra note 11. The Patriot Act overwhelmingly passed in the Senate 
by a vote of 98-1 and in the House of Representatives by a vote of 357-66. See, e.g., David 
Lerman, Critics Say Patriot Act Could Impose on Civil Liberties, DAILY PRESS (Oct. 28, 2001), 
at http://www.dailypress.com/news/columnists/dp-1795cm0oct28.column (on file with author).  
 54. The Patriot Act has far-reaching implications in many facets of surveillance and 
terrorism that are not relevant to this Note. Such changes include long-arm jurisdiction over 
money launderers, forfeiture of funds in U.S. interbank accounts, and a prohibition against 
harboring terrorists. For a complete discussion of the Patriot Act’s changes, see U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FIELD GUIDANCE ON NEW AUTHORITIES (Redacted) (2001) [hereinafter Field Guide], 
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/DOJ_guidance.pdf.  
 55. See Patriot Act, supra note 11, § 216. The DOJ explains that the Act revised 
“[r]eferences to the target [phone] ‘line’ . . . to encompass a ‘line or other facility.’ Such a 
facility might include, for example, a cellular telephone number . . . [or] an Internet user 
account or e-mail address.” See Field Guide, supra note 54, at 7.  
 56. See Patriot Act, supra note 11, § 216. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
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approach in Olmstead. Thus, although electronic information is still 
somewhat protected, the potential remains for governmental abuse. 
II. CARNIVORE AND ITS TARGETS 
A. A Free Reign of Terror: The Growth of Cybercrime60 
The past decade featured an expansive growth of various types of 
cybercrime.61 In response to this dilemma, the FBI developed 
Carnivore to ensure the safety and security of others by monitoring 
crimes such as terrorism, information warfare, child pornography, 
and securities fraud.62 An understanding of the prevalence and 
severity of these crimes is an essential component to understanding 
whether efficient regulation requires technology, such as Carnivore, 
to further curtail its growth. 
Although most communications sent through the Internet are 
benign, nefarious e-mails containing the plots of high-profile terrorist 
organizations have continued to increase at an alarming rate.63 
 
 60. Cybercrime covers an expansive area of the law, but for the purposes of this Note, will 
be limited in its scope to a brief overview of the key problem areas. 
 61. For a detailed analysis on the growth and impact of cybercrime, see Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (Apr. 2001). Professor Katyal 
states that:  
[C]ybercrime is becoming an increasingly common form of criminal activity. The 
numbers are staggering. The number of recorded computer security incidents grew 
from 6 in 1988 to more than 8000 in 1999. Theft on the internet caused $ 2 billion in 
losses in the year 1995, a number that is much higher today. One company has found 
100,000 instances of illegal activity on web sites in one and a half years . . . . Last year, 
there were more than 22,000 confirmed attacks against Department of Defense 
computers. It is no surprise that the FBI’s caseload has skyrocketed as a result of these 
trends.  
Id. at 1014-15 (citations omitted).  
 62. See Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 3, at 11 (statement by Dr. Donald Kerr, 
Director of the FBI’s Lab Division).  
 
 63. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act of 2000 and 
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 5018, H.R. 4987 and H.R. 4908 Before 
the House Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 33 (2000) 
[hereinafter ECPA 2000] (statement by Donald Kerr explaining the growth of online terrorist 
activity). In particular, Kerr explains that “[t]errorist groups are increasingly using new 
information technology . . . to formulate plans, raise funds, spread propaganda, and 
communicate securely. . . . [T]errorist groups, ‘including Hezbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal 
organization, and Bin Laden’s al Qa’ida [sic] organization are using computerized files, E-mail, 
and encryption to support their operations.’” Id. 
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Terrorist organizations typically send e-mail through ISPs that offer 
anonymous registration and Internet access at no cost to the user.64 If 
an act of terrorism occurs, the FBI will attempt to recover the 
suspect’s e-mail history from an ISP’s records but may discover that 
the requisite data has already been purged.65  
Aside from the difficulties in tracing a suspect’s digital trail, 
techniques such as encryption and steganography66 serve to further 
complicate the FBI’s monitoring of a terrorist’s Internet usage. 
Recent attacks illustrate a growing propensity to utilize 
steganography, as suspects attempt to conceal their directives within 
their laptops or computers; such files, presumably, were 
electronically transferred from one computer to another.67 
 
 64. See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, Terrorists Use Low and High-Tech Communication Yet 
Evade Detection, SAN JOSE MERC. NEWS, Oct. 10, 2001 (reporting that suspects sent hundreds 
of e-mails through Hotmail and Yahoo, in Arabic and English, prior to the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks); Farhad Manjoo, Terrorists Leave Paperless Trail, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 20, 
2001 (indicating that the “digital trail identified after the [World Trade Center] attacks—such as 
the use of e-mail addresses that can be created anonymously at a Kinko’s store—were of the 
type that couldn’t have been detected unless authorities were physically following the 
suspects”).  
 65. James Whittaker, a Professor at the Florida Institute of Technology and expert on 
computer security, states that “[a]lthough some e-mail programs store messages automatically, 
publicly accessible computers usually are purged on a daily or monthly schedule . . . . While a 
record of the e-mail would remain on a computer hard drive, it would stay there only until it 
was overwritten by something else.” Scott Wyman & Sally Kestin, FBI Tracks Internet Role in 
Terrorist Plot, SUN-SENT. (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 18, 2001, at 7A; but see Jim 
Puzzanghera, Terrorists’ Internet Use May Betray Them; FBI Is Following Up on Tracks They 
Left Behind, MIL. J. SENT., Sept. 21, 2001, at 14A (stating that even though bin Laden’s 
network uses free e-mail, it “employ[s] advanced computer software [to cover its tracks] . . . [, 
b]ut even a sophisticated computer user would not know how to delete every trace or record of 
the messages from a computer’s hard drive”). 
 66. For a discussion on steganography, see J. William Gurley, From Wired to 
Wiretapped: Forget Privacy Rights. The Real Problem With Government Snooping is That it 
Won’t Work, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 214. Gurley explains that steganography is: 
the act of embedding or hiding a message inside a seemingly innocent digital vessel. 
Several programs on the Internet, many of which . . . are free to download, make it 
easy to embed one file in another . . . . These encoding techniques are so slick that the 
resulting file is indistinguishable to the human eye or ear. As a result, a covert 
communication may appear as innocent as two parties sharing a . . . song over the 
Internet. USA Today has reported that Osama bin Laden and his followers are heavy 
users of steganography. 
Id. 
 Additionally, steganography is extremely difficult to detect, as it requires a comparison of 
the data content between the suspected imagery with its original; if steganography occurred, the 
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Accordingly, terrorists are not only evading authorities through 
anonymous e-mail, but are utilizing modern technology to further 
complicate the FBI’s surveillance.  
Similar to terrorism, the possible use of “information warfare”68 
raises concerns over the susceptibility of a country’s critical 
infrastructure.69 Recent intelligence points to the possible future use 
of such tactics as a means to counter the strength of the U.S. 
military.70 Likewise, in the past decade, hackers have launched a 
number of cyber-attacks against the electronic infrastructure of the 
United States, thereby exposing its vulnerability to more egregious 
 
data-size of the image’s current version will be substantially larger. Greg Wright, Terrorists 
Leave Footprints Across Internet: Policing Poses Rights Dilemma, DENV. POST, Oct. 8, 2001. 
 67. See Katyal, supra note 61, at 1048 (stating that “Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded 
the [1993] World Trade Center bombing, used encryption to store, on his laptop, detailed plans 
to destroy United States airliners. And many other terrorist networks, such as HAMAS, the Abu 
Nidal organization, and Osama bin Laden’s al Qa’ida, are using encryption as well.”); see, e.g., 
Daniel McGrory, Al-Qaeda Hid Coded Messages on Porn Sites, N.Y. TIMES (London ed.), Oct. 
6, 2001 (explaining that witnesses observed Mohammed Atta, alleged leader of the September 
11, 2001, terrorist hijackings, downloading holiday photographs from a public library that 
likely concealed his directives with steganography).  
 68. The government defines “information warfare” as an aggressive act “taken to achieve 
information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, 
information systems, and computer based networks while defending one’s own information.” 
Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses, 12 DEPAUL 
BUS. L.J. 59, 83 (1999) (quoting CJCSI, Number 3210.01 (Jan. 2, 1996)); see also WINN 
SCHWARTAU, INFORMATION WARFARE: CYBERTERRORISM—PROTECTING YOUR PERSONAL 
SECURITY IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE (2d ed. 1996) (providing definitions for “personal 
information warfare,” “corporate information warfare,” and “global information warfare”). 
 69. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63, at 33 (statement by Donald Kerr, explaining that 
“several foreign nations are developing information warfare doctrine, programs, and 
capabilities for use against the United States or other nations. Knowing that they cannot match 
our military might with conventional weapons, nations see Cyber attacks . . . as a way to hit . . . 
our growing dependence on information technology.”). 
 70. Id. For example, Kerr notes that two Chinese military officers authored a publication 
on the utility of launching computer viruses to counter the force of the United States military. 
Id. Additionally, a Russian official publicly recognized the potential for destruction from 
information warfare and likened it to a “weapon of mass destruction.” Id. Likewise, the FBI 
believes that Osama bin Laden directed his followers to launch cyber-attacks against the United 
States’ infrastructure. See, e.g., Dan Verton, Report: Al Qaeda a Potential Cyberthreat, 
CNN.COM, Jan. 8, 2002 (stating that “Bin Laden’s foot soldiers . . . have stated that they were 
trained specifically to attack critical infrastructures, including electric power plants, Natural gas 
plants, airports, railroads, large corporations and military installations”), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/internet/01/08/cyberterror.report.dg/index.html; John Lasker, 
Net Wars: Hackers are Using the Internet to Fight Battles at Home and Abroad, COLUMBUS 
DISP., Feb. 11, 2002, at E1 (explaining that “transportation, government, water, information and 
energy systems all could be damaged by negative entry into the Net”).  
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attacks.71 While information warfare poses a serious risk to a 
country’s electronic infrastructure, a clear means to combat it has yet 
to emerge. 
Terrorists are not the only ones exploiting the Internet for criminal 
ends; pedophiles often use it to lure children into sexual 
relationships72 and to distribute child pornography.73 Several 
governmental task forces exist solely to curtail this type of activity.74 
Difficulties often arise, however, because a task force must decode 
encrypted evidence to ascertain the identity of anonymous suspects.75 
 
 71. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 68, at 84-86 (providing an overview of cyber-
attacks against our country). Alexander notes that as early as 1986, a group of West German 
hackers were compiling stolen passwords from military and scientific computers. Id. at 84. 
Additionally, in 1998 an Israeli hacker launched cyber-attacks against the Pentagon and nuclear 
research labs. Id. Likewise, another hacker launched an attack in 1998 against the computers in 
the U.S. Department of Defense. Id. at 85. Lastly, in 2000, a number of attacks flooded and 
disabled web sites such as eBay, E*Trade, CNN, and Yahoo. Id. Moreover, Alexander cautions 
that information warfare has the potential for mass destruction, citing violent acts including:  
[A]ltering formulas for medication at pharmaceutical plants, “crashing telephone” 
systems, misrouting passenger trains, changing pressure in gas pipelines to cause valve 
explosions and fires, scrambling the software used by emergency services, “turning 
off” power grids, and detonating simultaneously hundreds of computerized bombs 
around the world . . . . [T]his new medium of communication . . . forces us to think 
about the “unthinkable” with grave concern.  
Id. at 88.  
 72. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63, at 34 (stating that “sexual predators find the Internet 
to be a well-suited medium to trap unwary children. Since 1995, the FBI has investigated nearly 
800 cases involving adults traveling interstate to meet minors for the purpose of illegal sexual 
relationships”); see also President’s Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, The 
Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet 
(2000) [hereinafter President’s Working Group] (finding that pedophiles are online twenty-four 
hours a day, looking to abduct children using chat channels and message boards), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#FTC. 
 73. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63, at 34 (finding that “[s]ince 1995, the FBI has 
investigated . . . more than 1850 cases involving child pornography–almost all of these involve 
the exchange of child pornography over the Internet”). 
 74. A sampling of these task forces include the Innocent Images Initiative of the FBI, the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention within the DOJ, and the Customs’ 
CyberSmuggling Center within the Customs Service. See President’s Working Group, supra 
note 72, at Appendix C § 3. The styles within each group vary widely, ranging from the FBI 
proactively finding suspects that are willing to travel to meet minors, to the Customs Service 
operating off the tips and leads submitted through their website. Id. Additionally, each group 
boasts a varying level of success, ranging from the FBI convicting over 358 offenders since 
December 1999, to the Customs Service convicting 436 offenders between November 1998 and 
September 1999. Id.  
 75. Id. at Appendix C § 4 (finding that “[t]he ease with which sophisticated users can be 
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Thus, not only does unregulated technology allow pedophiles to mask 
their identity and imagery, but it may also compromise the health and 
safety of young children. 
Finally, the use of electronic communication to facilitate securities 
fraud has thus far evaded federal regulation.76 Corporate insiders 
regularly commit this crime by electronically communicating77 with 
investors to convey both privileged78 and fraudulent information.79 
With a growing number of investors opening online accounts,80 the 
government’s limited resources simply cannot uncover the majority 
of fraudulent activity.81 The situation is exacerbated by the vast 
nature of the Internet, which provides countless convenient locations 
 
anonymous on the Internet, [along with] the use of sophisticated encryption to conceal [the] 
evidence of unlawful conduct[,] . . . hinder[s] law enforcement agencies’ ability to fight these 
types of crimes”). 
 76. Id. at Appendix H §§ 1-5 (discussing the problems associated with regulating 
electronic communication utilities that facilitate the commission of securities fraud). The FBI 
purports that the government’s inability to regulate this type of fraud “results in a loss to 
investors of approximately $10 billion per year (or nearly $1 million per hour).” ECPA 2000, 
supra note 63, at 34.  
 77. Fraudulent information is typically leaked over the Internet through Internet Relay 
Chats (IRC), message boards, and systems analogous to America Online’s Instant Messenger. 
Id.  
 78. See, e.g., id. (describing how one insider electronically leaked privileged information 
over a two-and-a-half year period, making $500,000 for his partners, and $170,000 for himself). 
 79. The President’s Working Group concluded that individuals using electronic 
communications to release fraudulent information helped promote market manipulation, 
offering frauds, and illegal touting. President’s Working Group, supra note 72, at Appendix H 
§ 1. See also, Katyal, supra note 61, at 1028-29 (describing a manipulation of the stock market 
when “someone holding XYZ stock will announce on message boards the likelihood of a 
hostile takeover . . . thousands will read the message and purchase XYZ, and the person who 
posted the messages will then quickly sell the stock at a high profit”). 
 80. See Securities Fraud on the Internet: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) [hereinafter 
Securities Fraud] (indicating that “nearly one-third of the [thirty million] American households 
now on-line use the Web for researching or investing in securities. In addition, studies report 
that some [three] million people now have on-line trading accounts, a number which is 
anticipated to reach [fourteen] million people by the year 2001.”). 
 81. The President’s Working Group found that current regulatory resources are 
inadequate, particularly as an increased number of investors are relying on the Internet for stock 
quotes and tips. President’s Working Group, supra note 72, at Appendix H § 1. Moreover, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Director openly admits that “[their] 
greatest problem will likely be one of resources, as the size of [their] staff has remained 
relatively constant while the Internet has grown by leaps and bounds.” See id. at Appendix H 
§ 4 (discussing the investigative challenges of regulating online securities fraud).  
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for the anonymous disclosure of fraudulent information.82 Until the 
government obtains the proper resources to monitor these disclosures, 
online securities fraud will continue to hamper the national economy. 
As cybercrime continues to become more common, an increasing 
number of criminals will rely on modern technology to evade 
detection. As evidenced by the aforementioned areas of crime, the 
FBI’s resources are simply inadequate to eliminate, or arguably 
curtail, the continual growth of cybercrime. 
B. A Call to Arms: The Implementation of Carnivore 
In 1999, the FBI recognized its limited resources and developed 
Carnivore to regulate and monitor online criminal activity.83 
Although initially implemented in secrecy,84 a newspaper revealed 
Carnivore to the public by detailing the plight of an ISP that refused 
to comply with the FBI’s request to install the system.85 Despite an 
initial wave of criticism, the FBI justified Carnivore’s monitoring 
system under the authority of the ECPA.86 
The FBI contends that Carnivore complies with the ECPA by 
operating on a case-by-case basis to collect information through 
either a pen register or a wiretap and, thus, can comport with a 
judicial order for either standard.87 In particular, the FBI maintains 
 
 82. See generally Securities Fraud, supra note 80, at 274-81 (explaining the utility of 
disclosing fraudulent information in various areas of cyberspace, including bulletin boards, chat 
rooms, “spam” emails, and “spoofing” websites). 
 83. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63, at 32-41 (explaining the FBI’s justification for 
implementing Carnivore). Kerr states that “the ability of the law enforcement community to 
effectively investigate and prevent these serious crimes is, in part, dependent upon our ability to 
lawfully and effectively intercept and acquire vital evidence of these crimes.” Id. at 41.  
 84. See Id. at 34 (stating that the FBI used Carnivore approximately twenty-five times 
during its period of secrecy);  
 85. See King & Bridis, supra note 1.  
 86. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63. 
 87. See Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 3, at 11-14 (prepared statement of Donald 
Kerr explaining Carnivore’s function). Kerr contends that: 
[Carnivore] works by “sniffing” the proper portions of network packets and copying 
and storing only those packets which match a finely defined filter set programmed in 
conformity with the court order. This filter set can be extremely complex, and this 
provides the FBI with an ability to collect transmissions which comply with pen 
register court orders, trap & trace court orders, Title III interception orders, etc. . . . It 
does NOT search through the contents of every message and collect those that contain 
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that Carnivore confines its search by “sniffing” any e-mail that passes 
through the ISP, filtering the data, and searching for whatever 
information it is programmed to find.88 Thereafter, Carnivore records 
the pertinent data and processes an event file to demonstrate its 
compliance with the court order.89 Thus, according to the FBI, 
Carnivore performs a confined search tailored to its judicial order and 
is therefore in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 
By contrast, both the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC)90 and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)91 contend 
that the FBI collects more data than it reports and, thus, have filed for 
the release of Carnivore’s source code under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).92 The House Judiciary Committee 
responded by conducting a lengthy hearing to examine Carnivore’s 
constitutionality.93 Although the hearing produced nothing 
conclusive, it did prompt the Department of Justice (DOJ) to contract 
with the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute94 (IITRI) 
 
certain key words like “bomb” or “drugs.” It selects messages based on criteria 
expressly set out in the court order . . . . 
Id. at 13.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See ECPA 2000, supra note 63, at 37-38 (prepared statement of Donald Kerr, 
explaining the various phases of a Carnivore search). In general, each search filters through the 
data, pinpoints the relevant information, records it for storage, and appends an event file. Id. at 
37-38. The event file serves as the FBI’s evidence that the search was conducted in compliance 
with the judge’s order. Id. at 38. Specifically, the file indicates whether the search functioned 
under pen register or wiretap mode and states the specific data that the enforcement agency 
programmed it to searched for. Id. 
 90. See Electronic Privacy Information Center’s Carnivore FOIA Litigation, at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore (last modified May 28, 2002).  
 91. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Urges Congress to Put a 
Leash on “Carnivore” and Other Government Snoopware Programs (July 12, 2000), at http:// 
www.aclu.org/news/2000/ n071200b.html. 
 92. See 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) 
(allowing citizens to access information, unless protected, that is contained in federal agency 
records). 
 93. See Fourth Amendment Issues, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that the hearing will be 
geared towards Carnivove, which raises “the question as to whether or not existing statutes 
protecting citizens ‘from unreasonable searches and seizures’ under the fourth amendment 
appropriately balance the concerns of law enforcement and privacy”). 
 94. The IITRI was founded in 1936 and is “a contract organization of more than 1,500 
scientists, engineers, and technical personnel focused on solving critical technology problems 
that often involve the use of sensitive, highly classified, or proprietary information.” IITRI, 
Company Profile, at http://www.iitri.org/company_info/company_info.cfm (last modified Aug. 
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to examine whether Carnivore operates as intended.95 Prior to the 
formal release of the IITRI’s report, the FBI attempted to allay public 
concern by complying with the FOIA and issuing several documents 
to the EPIC on the technical aspects of Carnivore.  
In December 2000, the IITRI released its report, which found that 
Carnivore was operating as claimed and was capable of adhering to a 
court order’s specific limitations.96 However, the study received a 
barrage of criticism premised on perceived governmental bias.97 
Critics also pointed out that the study implicitly contradicted several 
of the FBI’s prior assertions regarding Carnivore98 and failed to offer 
an opinion as to whether the program’s operation was legally, rather 
 
25, 2002). 
 95. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Selects Team to Review 
Carnivore System (Sept. 26, 2000) (explaining that IITRI team members are proficient in the 
technical and legal aspects of Carnivore and will assess whether the “system’s design, function 
and method of use” are as reported), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/ 
September/565jmd.htm. 
 96. See IITRI, Independent Technical Review of the Carnivore System, 65 (Sept. 20, 
2000) [hereinafter IITRI] (concluding that Carnivore’s source code indicates that the system 
cannot collect data without the knowledge of the agent using it), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/pss/iitritechnicalproposal.pdf. Specifically, the IITRI report 
responded to four questions posed by the DOJ. First, when Carnivore is used correctly, it has no 
hidden capabilities to collect additional information without any agent’s knowledge. Id. at 4-7. 
Second, Carnivore introduces neither a security nor operational risk to the ISP that it is installed 
on. Id. at 4-8. Third, Carnivore poses some risk of unauthorized acquisition of data by FBI 
personnel, but little additional risk to an acquisition by outsiders. Id. Finally, Carnivore “does 
not provide protections, especially audit functions, commensurate with the level of the risks.” 
Id. at 4-9. 
 97. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says Government 
Stacked Deck in Selection of Team to Review “Carnivore” Cyber-tapping System (Oct. 4, 
2000) (stressing that IITRI had a governmental bias, as it “include[d] a large number of White 
House insiders, including a former Clinton information policy advisor, and a former Justice 
Department official . . . . Other team members have backgrounds in the National Security 
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Treasury.”), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n100400.html. 
 
 98. See generally Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, EPIC Say 
Further Study of Carnivore Review Proves “Beast Must Be Tamed” (Dec. 1, 2000), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n120100.html. Both the ACLU and EPIC assessed the IITRI’s 
review, finding several inconsistencies between the IITRI’s findings and recommendations. 
First, the ACLU notes that test nine is indicative of Carnivore’s ability to collect more 
information than it is programmed to find. Id. Second, the ACLU objects to Carnivore’s 
conspicuous absence of an auditing function, contrary to the FBI’s claim that one exists. Id. 
Likewise, the EPIC points to the study’s contention that when the program is improperly 
configured it is capable of performing a “broad sweep” of information into its records. Id. 
Further, the EPIC contends that the review suggests a heightened potential for governmental 
abuse because the program lacks any means of accountability. Id. 
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than technically, sound.99  
In August 2001, a number of reports surfaced of the FBI’s plans to 
expand Carnivore’s capabilities to enable the monitoring of messages 
sent through wireless systems.100 In support of the expansion, the FBI 
pointed to the wireless industry’s failure to meet CALEA’s 
deadline101 for developing its own means of monitoring wireless 
communications.102 The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks further 
strengthened the FBI’s stance, as the orchestrators may have used 
wireless messaging while planning the attacks.103  
Although civil liberties organizations acknowledge the importance 
of wireless regulation,104 they maintain that Carnivore’s expansion 
will diminish personal liberties without a visible increase in national 
security.105 There also exists the possibility that the expansion will 
provide malicious hackers with added opportunities to access the 
information that Carnivore collects.106 Such concerns over 
 
 99. See IITRI, supra note 96, at xiv (stating that the review “specifically excluded 
questions of constitutionality”). 
 100. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr., FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ Might Target Wireless Text, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 24, 2001, at E1 (discussing the possibility of Carnivore’s expansion to wireless 
technology); Luening & Charny, supra note 5 (explaining how Carnivore could become the de 
facto means of monitoring wireless communications). 
 101. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Caron Carlson, Wiretap Provisions On Verge Of Change, WIRELESS WEEK, 
Sept. 24, 2001, at 1 (stating that the wireless industry is not close to meeting the FCC’s 
deadline); Heather Forsgren Weaver, Anti-Terrorism Legislation Hits Civil Liberties Wall, RCR 
WIRELESS NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, at 3 (stating that the wireless industry could not comply with 
CALEA due to “the tricky issue of allowing wiretaps on packet-mode data”). 
 103. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 6 (explaining that because “terrorists may have used 
wireless technology to coordinate the attacks, [it] has breathed new life into efforts to monitor 
even the most arcane and complex features of wireless networks”); Purcell, supra note 10 
(stating that “[i]n the two weeks since attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 
wireless carriers have seen a significant upsurge in requests for cell phone records and 
wiretaps”).  
 104. Civil liberty groups are willing to concede their stance against heightened regulation, 
but want proof that for a decrease in personal rights there will be a “commensurate improval” in 
public security. See Carlson & Callaghan, supra note 7. 
 105. See id. (explaining that civil liberty groups are concerned that “when individual rights 
are curtailed for the sake of public security at a time of heightened threat, those freedoms are 
lost forever”). 
 106. See, e.g., Luening & Charny, supra note 5 (stating that “it doesn’t take a rocket 
scientist to intercept [wireless] transmissions”); Michelle Delio, Wireless Networks in Big 
Trouble, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 20 2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/wireless/0,1382, 
46187,00.html. Delio describes a program called AirSnort, which allows hackers to intercept  
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Carnivore’s traditional function to monitor e-mail, and its potential 
expansion to wireless technology, bring forth the question of whether 
the program is in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Was the FBI’s Use of Carnivore, Prior to its Expansion, a Legal 
Exertion of its Governmental Authority?  
Although Justice Brandeis’s concerns may once have appeared far 
fetched, the rapid development of technology has turned his cryptic 
prophecy into a modern reality.107 Under Brandeis’s dissent in 
Olmstead,108 and the subsequent standard in Katz,109 evidence 
collected by Carnivore is arguably entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection. At a glance, such evidence appears to fall well within the 
Fourth Amendment boundaries of Katz because the data is intangible 
and would, thus, receive the same protection as other tangible 
evidence.110 Furthermore, as stated in Katz, the Fourth Amendment 
applies to people and not places, and, thus, its protections are not 
limited to the government’s physical intrusion into a suspect’s 
home.111  
The FBI sidesteps this apparent protection, however, by likening 
Carnivore to a pen register.112 Under Smith, a pen register is not 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy for the phone number of an 
 
wireless signals. Id. Recognizing that AirSnort might breach the security of a wireless 
network’s database, Delio states: 
Wireless networks are a little less secure . . . with the public release of . . . a tool that 
can surreptitiously grab and analyze data moving across just about every major 
wireless network. When enough information has been captured, AirSnort can then 
piece together the system’s master password. In other words, hackers and/or 
eavesdroppers using AirSnort can just grab what they want from a company’s database 
wirelessly, out of thin air. 
Id.  
 107. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 111. Id.  
 112. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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outgoing call.113 Congress echoed the Court’s view by promulgating 
the ECPA, which makes it much easier for law enforcement agencies 
to implement pen registers than wiretaps.114 Information gathered by 
pen registers accordingly receives little or no constitutional 
protection.  
Although characterizing Carnivore as a pen register enables the 
FBI to circumvent Fourth Amendment protections,115 it begs the 
question of whether Carnivore technically operates as a pen register. 
As discussed in Smith,116 a pen register simply collects a listing of 
phone numbers dialed by the suspect.117 In contrast to a true pen 
register, Carnivore collects a wide range of information, including the 
e-mail addresses of both the sender and recipient.118 Even this limited 
information would exceed the Smith test, as Internet users are far less 
likely to expect an outsider to freely access their e-mail as compared 
to their phone records. Specifically, whereas nearly all ISP’s 
guarantee security for their users,119 the same cannot be said for 
telephone numbers. A person dialing a phone number is readily 
aware that any phone number can be instantly identified either by 
caller identification or the phone company.120 Accordingly, this lack 
of personal privacy prevents Carnivore from sidestepping Fourth 
Amendment protections by complying with the flexible guidelines 
applicable to pen registers.  
If Carnivore does not operate as a pen register, it is seemingly 
most analogous to a wiretap. Similar to a wiretap’s ability to collect 
all information passing through a phone line, Carnivore can be 
 
 113. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. In hindsight, it appears suspect that the 
Court would freely dispense of all Fourth Amendment protection for evidence collected by pen 
registers, particularly after the significant progress made in Katz. See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. 
 116. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.  
 117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 118. See IITRI, supra note 96, at C-1. 
 119. For example, America Online’s corporate policy states that “[it does] not use or 
disclose information about [a user’s] individual visits to AOL.COM or information that [the 
user] may [provide], such as [their] name, address, email address or telephone number.” See 
America Online, America Online Privacy Policy, at http://www.corp.aol.com/privacy_ 
policy.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (emphasis added). 
 120. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
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programmed to collect all information passing through an ISP.121 
Although the FBI concedes that Carnivore has the potential to operate 
as either a pen register or wiretap, even in “pen register” mode the 
program mimics the function of a wiretap by sifting through and 
collecting massive amounts of data.122 Further, whereas wiretaps are 
constantly monitored and may be shut off upon encountering intimate 
information, Carnivore cannot; instead, the program continuously 
collects and records its evidence.  
In sum, Carnivore exceeds the limited collection that exemplifies 
a pen register, instead mimicking the broad search capabilities of a 
wiretap. As such, any evidence collected by Carnivore must receive 
Fourth Amendment protection.  
B. Will Carnivore’s Expansion Violate the Federal Wiretap 
Provisions? 
Since the enactment of CALEA, the FBI has continuously pressed 
the wireless industry to develop a means by which it can freely 
monitor wireless messages.123 Despite the industry’s continual 
requests for extensions, the FBI’s most recent ultimatum echoes as 
loudly as ever.124 With the enactment of the Patriot Act and the 
subsequent increase in Carnivore’s capabilities,125 it appears 
imminent that one of two situations will arise—either the wireless 
industry will develop the necessary technology or the FBI will 
formally implement Carnivore’s capability to intercept wireless 
messaging. Considering that it will take the wireless industry two 
years to develop its own technology and will cost the industry over 
one billion dollars,126 an expanded version of Carnivore is seemingly 
 
 121. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
 122. Id. Specifically, while operating under pen register mode, Carnivore can at a 
minimum collect the e-mail addresses of both the sender and recipient. If the EPIC’s claims are 
accurate, however, then Carnivore might in fact be collecting the entirety of the e-mail’s text. 
Regardless, under either approach the sender’s personal information is improperly breached, as 
he would have a reasonable expectation of privacy over the contents of his e-mail and, thus, 
must receive Fourth Amendment protection.  
 123. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 124. See id. 
 125. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.  
 
 126. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Dennis K. Berman, FBI Pressures Telecom Firms on 
Wiretaps, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2001, at A3 (describing the futility of the wireless industry’s 
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the only viable option.  
Regardless of the fact that Carnivore’s wireless capabilities are 
reportedly developed and ready for implementation, the expanded 
capabilities must still survive scrutiny in the courts. Prior to the 
passage of the Patriot Act, the implementation of this technology 
would have been particularly difficult, as electronic surveillance had 
to satisfy the ECPA’s requirement that collection occur over a phone 
line.127 In contrast Carnivore’s initial use of a phone line to connect to 
the Internet, the monitoring of wireless technology departs from a 
circuit-switched network, instead operating under a packet-switched 
mode128 that is specifically designed for continuous connection to a 
digital medium.129 The continuous connection of wireless networks 
differs greatly from a telephone line and would therefore fall short of 
the ECPA’s protection.  
Complications with wireless technology seemingly dissipate, 
however, with the enactment of the Patriot Act, as it explicitly allows 
the government to monitor information over a phone line and through 
any other “facility.”130 Moreover, the DOJ clarifies the definition of 
“facility,” specifically naming a cellular phone as a possible 
example.131 The DOJ’s inclusion of cellular technology not only 
implicitly authorizes Carnivore to monitor wireless messaging but 
also proceeds in the face of known security risks that allow hackers to 
intercept a wireless network’s signals and database.132  
Congress’s reasoning is best justified, however, in light of the 
Patriot Act’s preservation of Katz’s hierarchy for wiretaps and pen 
registers.133 Specifically, the Act permits any enforcement agency to 
obtain a pen register without appearing before a judge. The 
authorities need only make a showing of tenuous need.134 Although 
 
compliance with the FBI’s demands, particularly as the FBI already has the tool it needs—i.e., 
Carnivore—to regulate wireless messaging). 
 127. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 128. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 131. Id. 
 132. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 133. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.  
 134. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
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Congress passed the Act in response to a national crisis,135 virtually 
no requirements remain intact to regulate against the potential for 
governmental abuse. Evidently, though, Congress will continue in its 
precedent to differentiate between a pen register and wiretap.  
Whereas it might once have seemed improbable for Carnivore to 
regulate wireless technology, the Patriot Act all but implemented the 
necessary changes for an expeditious transition. Although questions 
remain as to whether wireless regulation is a sensible solution, 
Congress’s enactment of the Patriot Act clearly demonstrates its view 
that the security of the United States must come before the security of 
personal information.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Patriot Act severely limited any progress made for electronic 
civil liberties and cemented in place a proactive means for 
governmental surveillance.136 While the Patriot Act made specific 
changes to modern surveillance laws, it sharply foreclosed any 
alternative that would limit governmental surveillance. The Patriot 
Act consequently leaves Carnivore as the only viable means to fight 
cybercrime. 
Considering Congress’s preservation of the Katz hierarchy, it 
would be best, when dealing with cyberspace, to eliminate the 
distinction between pen registers and wiretaps. Judging by the 
problems in characterizing Carnivore as a pen register,137 a single 
standard for the government to abide by would be far simpler. 
Although this change may appear radical, in reality it is not, as 
Carnivore never truly functioned as a pen register.138 Treating all 
electronic surveillance as a wiretap, thus allowing the government to 
collect information while abiding by strict procedural guidelines, is 
the most appropriate approach when dealing with cyberspace.  
In essence, this change would merely reflect the fact that the FBI 
operates a powerful tool that is closely analogous to a wiretap—a tool 
 
 135. See supra note 52-53. 
 136. See supra Part III.B.  
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.  
 138. Id.  
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that should realistically be accorded with similar precautions.139 
Unfortunately, Congress’s long history of distinguishing pen registers 
from wiretaps140 suggests that the transition to a single standard is 
unlikely to occur. This is unfortunate because a single standard would 
preserve a regulatory role and protect against governmental abuse. 
Considering that the Patriot Act overwhelmingly passed in both 
the House and Senate in spite of Congress’s history of opposing 
Carnivore,141 one wonders if legislators were fully aware of the Act’s 
far reaching effects and thoughtfully considered other alternatives. 
Some speculate that certain legislators used the terrorist attacks to 
push through previously impassable legislation, arguing that the 
controversial provisions would help deter cybercrime.142 The Act’s 
inclusion of innocuous words such as “facility”143 leads one to 
wonder whether its overwhelming passage arose out of patriotism or 
confusion. 
Although the Patriot Act is not limited to electronic 
surveillance,144 its subtle changes facilitate the future monitoring of 
cybercrime and realistically eclipse any other means of regulation. In 
particular, the Patriot Act’s departure from phone lines places no 
limitation on a potential source for collecting evidence, making 
Carnivore an operational means for the government to proactively 
attack cybercrime. The Patriot Act not only empowers the 
government to combat cybercrime, but it also broadly accommodates 
the expansion of modern technology. As a result, future change is 
severely limited and would likely require drastic amendments to the 
Act’s current version.  
Lastly, public policy after September 11 is a rather thorny issue 
and will at least temporarily increase the authority of law 
enforcement. The severity of online crime unquestionably deserves 
 
 139. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 140. Id. 
 141. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
 142. See generally Editorial, The Home Front: Security and Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2001, § 4, at 16 (explaining that “some [changes] amount to a wish list of things that the Justice 
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have unsuccessfully lobbied for in the past 
and that do not make sense now”). 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. 
 144. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
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legislative attention,145 but one must wonder whether this particular 
national security concern should trump the Fourth Amendment. 
Carnivore’s characterization as a pen register, despite blatant 
differences in its operation,146 exemplifies a means by which law 
enforcement agencies freely dispose of constitutional liberties. As a 
result, Congress’s failure to address Carnivore’s categorization 
implicitly suggests that national security takes priority over personal 
privacy in the area of electronic communication.  
Even though Carnivore may infringe on the Fourth Amendment, 
there is simply no other viable means to combat cybercrime.147 Given 
the devastation of September 11, along with sophisticated tactics such 
as steganography,148 it is in Congress’s best interest to disregard 
Carnivore’s constitutional issues.149 The only alternatives are to either 
abandon electronic surveillance or develop a new form of technology 
that passes constitutional muster. At this point in time, with hostilities 
on the horizon, both options are seemingly impractical. Likewise, one 
would expect that any new means of surveillance would be even 
more radical than Carnivore and would inevitably result in many of 
the same privacy concerns.150  
V. CONCLUSION 
Carnivore’s legality was tenuous before its potential expansion, 
and even considering the Patriot Act’s changes, it still exceeds the 
limited collection that typifies a pen register. With the growth of 
cybercrime and the advent of sophisticated techniques to avoid 
detection, however, the only viable alternative is to turn a blind eye 
 
 145. See supra Part II.B.  
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.  
 147. See supra Part III.B. 
 148. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.  
 149. See supra Part III.B. 
 150. See, e.g., What’s Next? The Issues and Ideas That Will Change and Challenge Us As 
We Go Forward, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Jan. 7, 2002 (discussing Magic Lantern, “a rogue program 
[in development] that penetrates computers to steal the password keystrokes that can defeat 
encryption”); David Canton, Virus Raises Questions, LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 25, 2002, at C3 
(explaining that Magic Lantern sends a virus to a suspect’s e-mail that automatically grants “the 
FBI [with] access to the key or password to the encryption software, therefore enabling agents 
to read data that has been scrambled. It allows actual keystrokes to be monitored, rather than the 
encrypted messages that follow.”).  
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toward the program’s deficiencies. Perhaps the perfect form of 
regulation is ahead of us, but to get there, technology simply needs 
more time to develop. Until then, Carnivore remains the only 
effective way to combat cybercrime and should properly continue in 
its regulation of both electronic and wireless technology.  
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